Abstract -Public Key Infrastructures (PKIs) are complex distributed systems that are responsible for giving users enough information to make reasonable trust judgments about one another. PKI is a prerequisite for security in distributed systems and for electronic commerce. The validation of public keys is hence of paramount importance. This is achieved by public-key certificates. Several researches have done to evaluate the confidence afforded; one of them is Maurer's model. The problem of assigning and evaluating confidence values numerically (Maurer model) is non-trivial, in particular when certification paths intersect. A restriction in this model is that certificate revocation is not included, but usually revocation happens. While Maurer consider only positive evidence, in this paper has been considered negative evidence as well as revocation. Moreover a few of authors incorporate negative values in inference rules on deterministic part. In this paper we have used a tailored form of that and consider revocation on inference rules. After that negative evidence to exert in probabilistic part, with to take in to a suitable value for this evidence omits the path of trust include the revoked certification.
I. INTRODUCTION
rust has become a very important part of our lives, since has growth remarkable of computer networks, with many new applications such as e-commerce, e-government, and digital library. However, networks-and in particular Internet is inherently insecure. A hacker can corrupt data, steal sensitive information, or masquerade as another user. Public key infrastructure (PKI) is a prerequisite for security in networks and distributed systems.
Trust in PKI plays the central role in providing security of the information system. The information must be digitally signed or transported over secure channels to ensure that it comes from the claimed sources [1] .
Certification authority (CAs) creates certificates for user authentication procedures that require one user to obtain another user's public key cryptography. So that users trust the public key, the CA employs a digital signature to cryptographically sign, he certificate in order to provide assurance that the information within the certificate is correct. They have a validity period and may be revoked by the issuing entity if required but in the traditional PKI model did not consider revocation. We should pay attention to the issue of public key revocation.
The status of a public key certificate can change during its lifetime, Due to different constraints; a certificate is only valid within a specific period of time. Coming from several threat (i.e. loss of private key, etc.) reasons why its validity must be terminated sooner than assigned and thus, the certificate needs to be revoked. We can consider revocation as well as negative trust. If a model of trust includes both positive and negative evidence then this is more accurate and flexible [2] .
Our primary goal in this paper is to design a method to incorporate revocation status information into the trust metric. In fact this researcher problem was considered as an interesting but non-trivial open problem in both [3] , [4] .
Some recent research works [5] , [6] , [7] paid attention to Maurer's model with trust and recommendation considering only the positive trust values. In this paper we have incorporated to that.
Bicakci (ET all) [5] used of a deterministic part of Maurer's model and incorporate negative value in a PKI model but omission the recommendation. Jonczy, Haenni [6] and Marchesini, Smith.S [7] used of Maurer's model and incorporate negative value in deterministic part but those works were without numerical result our aim is give a numerical result about the trust, this result help to user to find a suitable path of trust.
The purpose of Maurer's paper was to complement previous work on practical ad hoc approaches. The strategy to improve security in Ad-hoc networks is to develop mechanisms that allow a node to evaluate trustworthiness of other nodes. When negative value is added to this model then this evaluation becomes near to real value. This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we discuss various aspect of trust, centralized versus decentralized PKI, negative and positive evidence (certificate revocation), trust metric and trust models, Section 3 presents the mechanism to add a negative value in deterministic and probabilistic model. Faculty of Engineering, Universiti Putra Malaysia, 43400 Serdang Selangor, MALAYSIA II. RELATED WORK Different forms of trust exist to address different types of problems and mitigate risks in certain conditions. There have been many definitions of trust proposed for addressing some specific aspects. Hear we explain several aspect of trust.
A. Centralized Versus Decentralized PKI
By centralized trust, we refer to the situation where a globally trusted party calculates trust values for every node in the system. The situation described has two important implications. First, every user depends on the trustworthiness of this single party. Second, it is reasonable to assume that different users are expected to have different opinions about the same target. Trust established on PKI, if our target is to understand centralized trust then we need to pay attention to centralized PKI, Several structures support public-key certification, one of them is hierarchical structures, In the case of the X500/X509 certificates the infrastructure is hierarchical, spanned by a tree with a Root Certification Authority [8] .
Burmester and Desmedt [9] ; believed hierarchies are a disaster in the making, because the hierarchy that consists of a RCA and its CAs is a clear target for hackers. If a hacker succeeds in penetrating the RCA then the security of the system is completely broken. To understand the other PKIs we briefly discuss the concept of trust graph. Achieving authenticity of public keys can be done in several ways. The most popular approach is based on the concept of digital certificate. The idea is that different users of a network certify public keys of other network users. This leads to a certificate graph. Of course, certificates should only be issued if the key's authenticity is verified. On the basis of a certificate graph, one can then evaluate the authenticity of the keys on the basis of how much trust one assigns to the different issuers of the certificates. Because such an evaluation depends on trust, it is common to call such a certificate graph web of trust, Please see [10] , [11] . Here Burmester and Desmedt [9] have a suggestion for solved the problem of hierarchical PKI that is Horizontal Approach (Trust-Graphs with Multiple Connectivity).
The decentralized version of the trust problem corresponds to each user being the "center of (his/her) own world." That is, users are responsible for calculating their own trust values for any target they want. This "bottom-up" approach is the one that has been most widely implemented, as a part of Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) for public key certification [12] .
Note that the distinction just mentioned refers to the semantics of trust. The actual algorithm used for the computation of trust is a separate issue: all data may be gathered at a single user, where the algorithm will be executed; or the computation may be done in a distributed fashion, throughout the network; or the algorithm may even be localized, in the sense that each node only interacts with his local neighborhood, without expecting any explicit cooperation from nodes further away.
B. Negative and Positive Evidence (Certificate Revocation)
It is desirable to include both positive and negative evidence in the trust model. The model is then more accurate and flexible [2] . The status of a public key certificate can change during its lifetime due to unexpected events (i.e. loss of private key, etc.) When a node is compromised (e.g., its private key is stolen) the public key certificates for this node should be revoked. So, revocation can be seen as a special case of negative trust evidence. Thus a solution to reflect this possible change should be found.
A straightforward solution is to use instant or short-lived certificates which have a very short lifetime therefore eliminates the requirement of revocation check. Since this method requires the users to frequently communicate with the CA to get new certificates, it can not be always used. For long-lived certificates, a separate mechanism for revocation check needs to be implemented. Wohlmacher [13] explained some main methods like CRL, CRS, CRT, and OCSP.
CAs use CRLs to publicize the revocation of a subject's certificate. The CRLs are stored in the directory as attributes and are checked by relying parties to verify that a user's certificate has not been revoked. The fields in a CRL identify the issuer, the date the current CRL was generated, the date by which the next CRL will be generated, and the revoked users' certificates. Delta CRLs and Certificate Revocation Trees (CRTs) are two different improvements to basic CRLs. They succeed in decreasing the bandwidth of revocation information.
The certificate revocation system (CRS) has been introduced by Silvio Micali in 1995. His idea uses online/offline signatures. He improved his idea, where he redefines CRS by revocation status. A CRS mixes positive and negative lists and thus, gives direct evidence. A new mechanism, Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) has been introduced and developed by IETF. It specifies a protocol used to determine the current validity status of a certificate online Trust is often based on recommendation [3] . Recommendations are of fundamental importance in our society because it is impossible to know personally the entire people one has to rely on. Such recommendation can be implicit or explicit. The fact that one generally trusts a policeman is an example of an implicit recommendation while a letter of recommendation for job application is explicit. A recommendation can be thought of as a signed statement about the trustworthiness of another entity and is similar to a certificate. Ray and Chakraborty [1] consider negative and positive measure for recommendation, in the model suggested by them a recommendation about a trustee is defined as a measure of the subjective or objective judgment of a recommender.
C. Trust Metric
The term 'trust metric' can be defined as the measure of amount of trust attached to something. This 'something' can simply be anything: a person, a file, a URL, a country etc. Public key certificates are just one other application for trust metrics [5] . Exploitation of Trust Metrics allows presenting only relevant and reliable information [14] .
In a traditional PKI model, the trust relationship between any two entities is expressed in binary simply by either 0 or 1 (i.e. 0 means not trusted and 1 means trusted) [2] , but Ji Ma and Orgun [15] in a recently work used of the binary-valued model.
In the Maurer's [3] probabilistic model of PKI, probabilities as parameters of subjective belief (denoted as confidence levels) are used as the trust metric for public key certificates. In order to be able to combine and exploit several independent certification paths or recommendation it is necessary to measure confidence. He used of probabilistic logic, it appears natural to use a scale from 0 to 1, where 0 stands for no confidence and 1 stands for complete confidence, and to interpret these values as probabilities. In the Maurer's model considered multiple and recommendation but do not considered revocation.
The various trust statements has raised questions among other researchers. They argue that there is an ambiguity in the semantics and there is no easy way to determine the value of these parameters in real world. For instance, Reiter and Stubblebine [4] suggested a different approach to assign such values and to use numeric labels as a trust metric representing the amount of money.
The (Quality of Information) QoI-trust metric has a value between 0 and 1. If this value close to 0 means that either the information is known to be useless On the other hand, a QoItrust value close to 1 indicates that the information will meet the needs of the consumer with a very high likelihood [16] .
The point of Ray and Chakraborty [1] is existing trust models (even those that associate multiple levels to trust) their model of trust in which trust is defined as a vector of numeric values. Each element of the vector is a parameter in determining the value of trust. They associate a numeric value in the range [-1, 1] with the trust vector. The value in the positive region of this range is used to express trust and that in the negative region is used to express distrust. Within this model considered multiple path, recommendation and revocation.
The metric that we attribute to Zimmermann is used in PGP public key management systems, in that the user augments each node with a trust value, which is one of "unknown, untrusted, marginally trusted, or fully trusted" [17] .
D. Trust model
A number of logic-based formalisms of trust have been proposed by researchers each of them established on one of the metrics illustrate in section(3), PKIs are complex distributed systems that are responsible for giving users enough information to make reasonable trust judgments about [1] , [5] , [6] , [7] .
Maurer [3] has proposed two models for a public key infrastructure. He called the first one as the deterministic model however this product of confidence parameter of authentication of entity issuing the certificate. The second one was probabilistic model. In the probabilistic part, probabilities stand for degrees of uncertainty. His method is based on a well-defined model takes into accounts not only certificates but also recommendations.
In the deterministic part, he considered the pieces of evidence that a user allow to derive that a public key is authentic for certain entity. The deterministic part corresponds to what we here call the model of the confidence valuation.
In this model, a relying party Alice can use a certificate issued by Certification Authority (CA) X for user Bob if and only if Alice knows the public key for X and believes that it is authentic, and Alice trusts X to be honest and to correctly authenticate the owner of a public key before signing it. To determine whether Alice can deduce these facts; the calculus contains five types of statements and three inference rules. Alice can use her initial view (her axioms) and the rules to derive new statements. A valid statement is one contained in Alice's derived view. Maurer considered statements are of one of the following forms: -Authenticity of public keys.
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Aut , Denotes Alice's belief that a particular public key X P is authentic (i.e. belong to entity X) and is represented graphically as an edge from A to X: A X. -Trust. 
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Alice's derived view from is the set A View of statement derivable from her initial view A View . Several researcher used of deterministic model; Marchesini and Smith [7] added the concept of time to this model calculus so that they could model expiration and revocation. Jonczy and Hanni [6] incorporated negative value to deterministic model and used of qualitative evaluation of probabilistic argumentation system means finding minimal sets of arguments, counterarguments, and conflicts. In this manner Bicakci [5] used incorporate revocation in deterministic model but concentrate on the simpler model involving only the certificates. Here we will use from a tailor form of Jonczy [6] work and add a new inference rule in deterministic model. :
In Maure's model [3] , conclusions about whether a given public key is sufficiently authenticated to be used in a particular application, are derived from Alice's view. Her view consists of statement about which public keys she believes initially to be authentic and which entities she believes initially to be trustworthy, and a collection of certificates and recommendations obtained or retrieved from the PKI. The model takes into account confidence values for statements and can exploit arbitrary certification structures containing multiple intersecting certification paths in order to achieve a higher confidence value than for any single certification path. Confidence values are measured on a continuous scale between 0 and 1 and are interpreted as probabilistic in a welldefined random experiment (or probability structure).
A probability-based method called "confidence valuation" was proposed [3] , [18] : it allows computing the uncertainty of a user about the authenticity of a public key, based on his/her initial uncertainty in the pieces of evidence he/she holds. In the probabilistic part, probabilities stand for degrees of uncertainty. This method is based on a well-defined random experiment. The probabilistic method is inspired from other uncertainty methods, where probabilities stand for degrees of uncertainty or subjective belief.
A view often taken in probability theoretic approach to reasoning with uncertain information is that the sample space of the probability structure is a set of possible worlds and that the real world correspond to one of these worlds, each with a certain probability.
The probability that a statement is true is the total probability of all worlds in witch the statement is true. Possible worlds differ in the axioms, and they can even differ in the set of inference rules that are applicable in the world. Now we would like to introduce our extended probabilistic PKI model which contains the revocation status information. In Maure's model the confidence value for the public key certificate is assigned explicitly without revocation. We would like to take into account also the revocation therefore in a similar manner we can use of inference rule (3) for this aim.
We have two confidence values, one for the public key certificate and the other is for the revocation information of the public key. How can we combine these two values in a reasonable manner?
We know confidence value of probabilistic model change in ] 1 , 0 [ domain, and then we will consider value for negative happen so that the results stay in ] 1 , 0 [
. In this manner we consider 0 values for any certification was revoked to infer; emphasize certificate don't exist.
In the probabilistic model, Maurer replaced the view in the deterministic model by a probability distribution over a finite set of possible views, i.e. by a random variable taking as values deterministic views. Note that for a finite sample space S , the events are all the subsets of S , and a probability measure is specified completely by assigning probabilities to all the sample points.
In the probabilistic model Maurer [3] replaced the view in the deterministic model by a probability distribution over a finite set of possible view. The probability of an event is the sum of the probabilities of the sample points it contains. Consider 
is a probability function on the sample space A S 2 . Let V be a subset of A S then ) (V P and ) ( V View P A = denote the same probability. The confidence value of a statement
, is the probability that it can be derived from A S , i.e., it is:
An interesting and natural restriction for the measure P is to assume that the confidence parameters initially assigned to all the statements in Alice's initial view A S (i.e. the edges in the graph) are independent. This model dose not requires an independence assumption, but for the sake of simplicity all the examples considered below are based on it.
We are interested in computing the probability that particular subsets, usually minimal, minimal means that when one statement is deleted from the set, then 
( ) V P , can be computed for the case where there are no trust and recommendation statement of level greater than 1:
In the general case, ( ) V P is defined similarly. A generally much more efficient algorithm is obtained by determining all the minimal subsets, it is the union of the events
IV. EXAMPLES Here we explain a simple example, then consider revocation of one certificate and use inference rule (3) to drive new A View . Furthermore, Alice trusts both X and Y to correctly certify public keys (see figure 1 ). More formally, we have: 
V. CONCLUSION
The problem of certificate revocation in the context of trust metric for PKI is considered here. This problem is tackled by using credential networks for deterministic part and omitted the path include revocation in probabilistic part.
In this paper a decentralize model is used. This model is compatible with the Ad-hoc networks. In computation, it must specify which mechanism for revocation statues to conform this model. For any model of public key certification there is an inherent trade off between the levels of details of a particular scenario. Our model do not consider revocation of recommendation for simplify. Here we work only about the negative value in certification but this method can be extending for enter the negative value in recommendation event, so in this model do not consider the concept of time, these are area for feature work.
